We formalize what it means to have permission to say something. We adapt the dynamic logic of permission by van der Meyden (J Log Comput 6(3): [465][466][467][468][469][470][471][472][473][474][475][476][477][478][479] 1996) to the case where atomic actions are public truthful announcements. We also add a notion of obligation. Our logic is an extension of the logic of public announcements introduced by Plaza (1989) with dynamic modal operators for permission and for obligation. We axiomatize the logic and show that it is decidable.
Introduction
Consider an art school examining works at an exhibition. A student is supposed to select one of the displayed works and is then permitted to make a number A prior version of this work was presented at the ESSLLI 2009 workshop Logical Methods for Social Concepts, Bordeaux, France, 2009 [3] . In that paper a different semantics for the permission operator was presented, and it did not have an obligation operator. Hans van Ditmarsch is listed as an author of this prior version, and has also actively contributed to the final version. However, he has withdrawn as an author of the final version, because he is an editor of the Journal of Philosophical Logic. Pablo Seban was his PhD student at the time of submission. Hans has not been involved in the decision process for this special issue contribution at any time or in any way, and he is ignorant of the reviewers of the contribution.
P. Balbiani · P. Seban (B) Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse, CNRS -Université de Toulouse, 118 Route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex 9, France e-mail: seban@irit.fr of intelligent observations about it, sufficient to impress the examiners with the breadth of her knowledge. Now in such cases it never hurts to be more informative than necessary, in order to pass the exam, but a certain minimum amount of intelligent information has to be passed on. This particular museum has both the Night Watch by Rembrandt and Guernica by Picasso on display in the same room! You pass the exam if you observe about the Night Watch that a big chunk of a meter or so is missing in the left corner, that was cut off in order to make the painting fit in the Amsterdam Townhall (a 1 ), and that the painter was Rembrandt van Rijn (a 2 ). Clearly, this is not a very difficult exam. You also pass the exam if you make two of the three following observations: that Guernica depicts the cruelties of the Spanish Civil war (b 1 ), that it is painted in black and white and not in colour (b 2 ), and that the painter was Pablo Picasso (b 3 ). It is not permitted to make observations about different paintings at the same time, so any conjunction of a i 's and b j 's is not permitted: it would amount to bad judgement if you cannot focus on a single painting. You are obliged to make two observations about the Rembrandt and in that case say nothing about the Picasso, or to make at least two of the three possible observations about the Picasso and in that case say nothing about the Rembrandt. We can treat the permissions and obligations in this setting in an extension of public announcement logic.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
The logic of public announcements proposed by Plaza in [17] (reprinted in [18] ) is an extension of multi-agent epistemic logic. It permits to express how agents update their knowledge after public announcements of true propositions. Let p be the proposition that there is a thunderstorm in Eindhoven, and a be the agent Pablo, whereas b is the agent Hans. The language of public announcement logic contains epistemic operators K a and K b such that ¬K a p stands for "Pablo does not know that there is a thunderstorm in Eindhoven". It also contains so-called dynamic epistemic operators [ψ] such that [K b p]K a p means "After Hans tells Pablo that there is a thunderstorm in Eindhoven, Pablo knows that there is a thunderstorm in Eindhoven. These operators [ψ] are dynamic modal operators, of the necessity kind, that might be seen as labelled with the formula of the announcement, so we could see it as well as ψ -that might appeal slightly more to a reader familiar with modal logic. The logic of public announcements is only one of many dynamic epistemic logics, for example, there are also logics for private announcements, logics combining factual and epistemic change, dynamic epistemic logics for belief revision, etc. A fair number of such extensions are presented in the monograph-type chapter [5] . Latest developments involve quantification over informative actions, as in [1, 23] . For a standard treatment of the logic of public announcements, see [24] . A number of paradoxes can be explained by their formalizations in dynamic epistemic logic, for example, announcement of p ∧ ¬K a p (the Moore-sentence [15] ) makes p known to agent a: K a p, and its
